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Abstract
Our concern is the extension of the theory of the Shapley value to problems
involving externalities. Using the standard axiom systems behind the Shapley
value for an arbitrary exogenous coalition structure leads to the identiﬁcation of
bounds on players’ payoﬀs around an “externality-free” value. In endogenizing the
coalition structure, we analyze a two-stage process of coalition formation in whose
second stage our axiomatic results are applied. We ﬁnd reasons to explain ineﬃcient
coalition structures, and provide suﬃcient conditions for eﬃciency.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: C7, D62
Keywords: externalities, marginal contributions, Shapley value, Pigouvian trans-
fers, coalition formation.
1 Introduction
Since the path-breaking work of Shapley (1953), much eﬀort has been devoted to the
problem of “fair” distribution of the surplus generated by a collection of people that
are willing to cooperate with one another. More recently, the same question has been
posed in the realistic case where externalities across coalitions are present. This is the
general problem to which this paper contributes. The presence of such externalities is an
important feature in many applications. In an oligopolistic market, the proﬁt of a cartel
∗We thank Isa Emin Hafalir, Sergiu Hart, Eric Maskin, and David P´ erez-Castrillo for comments and
encouragement. Serrano gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of Universidad Carlos III and CEMFI
in Madrid, and the research support from Fundaci´ on Banco Herrero and Universidad Carlos III.
†Department of Economics, Rice University; declippel@rice.edu
‡Department of Economics, Brown University and IMDEA-Ciencias Sociales;
roberto serrano@brown.edu
1depends on the level of cooperation among the competing ﬁrms. The power of a political
alliance depends on the level of coordination among competing parties. The beneﬁt of
an agent that refuses to participate in the production of a public good depends on the
level of cooperation of the other agents (free-riding eﬀect), and so on.
In the absence of externalities, Shapley (1953) obtained a remarkable uniqueness
result. He characterized a unique solution using the axioms of eﬃciency, anonymity,
additivity and null player. Today we refer to this solution as the Shapley value, which
happens to be calculated as the average of marginal contributions of players to coalitions.
This comes as a surprise at ﬁrst glance: uniqueness is the consequence of four basic
axioms, and nothing in those axioms hints at the marginality principle, of long tradition
in economic theory. In the clariﬁcation of this puzzle, Young (1985) provides a key
piece. He formulates the marginality principle as an axiom, i.e., that the solution should
be a function of players’ marginal contributions to coalitions. He drops additivity and
null player as requirements. The result is that the only solution satisfying eﬃciency,
anonymity and marginality is again the Shapley value.
In our extension of the theory of the Shapley value to settings with externalities,
we shall pursue two approaches: axiomatic and strategic. In our axiomatic analysis, we
will ﬁnd that appealing systems of basic axioms that were used in problems with no
externalities do not suﬃce to yield a unique solution. Thus, multiplicity of solutions
seems essential to the problem at hand (this is conﬁrmed by previous studies, in which
authors must resort to new additional axioms to get uniqueness). Despite the multiple
solutions, the novelty of our approach is to provide reﬁned predictions based on payoﬀ
bounds implied by the axioms. In our strategic approach, we shall attempt to endogenize
the coalition structure and turn to coalition formation questions.
In order to tackle the question in axiomatic terms, we sort out the eﬀects of intrinsic
marginal contributions of players to coalitions from those coming from externalities. The
model we shall employ is that of partition functions, in which the worth of a coalition S
may vary with how the players not in S cooperate. In the model, v(S,Π) is the worth
of S when the coalition structure is Π, S being an element of Π. To deﬁne player i’s
marginal contribution to coalition S –a trivial task in the absence of externalities–, it
is now crucial to describe what happens after i leaves S. Suppose i plans to join T,
another coalition in Π. The total eﬀect on S of i’s move is the diﬀerence v(S,Π)−v(S \
{i},{S\{i},T ∪{i}}∪Π−S,−T). This eﬀect can be decomposed into two. First, there is an
intrinsic marginal contribution eﬀect associated with i leaving S but before joining T, i.e.,
v(S,Π)−v(S\{i},{S\{i},{i}}∪Π−S). And second, there is an externality eﬀect, which
2stems from the change in the worth of S\{i} when i, instead of remaining alone, joins T,
i.e., the diﬀerence v(S \{i},{S \{i},{i}}∪Π−S)−v(S \{i},{S \{i},T ∪{i}}∪Π−S,−T).
(Note how this latter diﬀerence is not a “partial derivative,” a marginal contribution of
player i to coalition S.) Our results follow from exploiting this decomposition.1
Assuming that the grand coalition forms, we investigate the implications of eﬃciency
and anonymity, together with a weak version of marginality.2 According to this last
property, the solution may depend on all the total eﬀects –the sum of the intrinsic mar-
ginal contribution and the externality eﬀects. We ﬁnd the ﬁrst noteworthy diﬀerence
with respect to the case of no-externalities, because in our larger domain these axioms
are compatible with a wide class of linear and even non-linear solutions (Examples 1 and
2). However, despite such a large multiplicity of solutions, our ﬁrst result shows that if
the partition function can be written as the sum of a symmetric partition function and
a characteristic function, a unique payoﬀ proﬁle is the consequence of the three axioms
(Proposition 1). As will be formally deﬁned in the sequel, this class amounts to having
symmetric externalities.
But for general partition functions, as a result of our ﬁrst ﬁnding, we seek the im-
plications of strengthening the weak version of marginality, and we do so in two ways.
First, we require monotonicity, i.e., a player’s payoﬀ should be increasing in all the total
eﬀects –the sum of his intrinsic marginal contribution and externality eﬀects. Then, we
are able to establish useful upper and lower bounds to each player’s payoﬀ (Proposition
2). And second, complementing this result, we require a marginality axiom, according to
which a player’s payoﬀ should depend on the vector of intrinsic marginal contributions,
not on the externality eﬀect. The result is a characterization of an “externality-free”
value on the basis of eﬃciency, anonymity and marginality (Proposition 3). In a second
characterization result (Proposition 4), this solution is obtained using a system of axioms
much like the original one due to Shapley (with a strong version of the dummy axiom
that also disregards externalities).3
The externality-free value thus appears to be a natural reference point. Obviously, an
analysis based solely on the externality-free value is not desirable in a model of external-
1In this decomposition, we are focusing on the “simplest path”, i.e., that in which player i leaves S,
and stays as a singleton before joining T. As we shall see, the singletons coalition structure acts as a
useful origin of coordinates from which externalities are measured.
2Similar results can be established for any exogenous coalition structure, if the axioms are imposed
atom by atom in the partition.
3Straightforward adaptations of the principle of balanced contributions (Myerson (1980)), and of some
bargaining procedures (Hart and Mas-Colell (1996); P´ erez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001)), once applied
to the larger domain of partition functions, lead to the externality-free value as well.
3ities. This is why we do not insist on uniqueness, and accept the multiplicity of solutions
inherent to the problem. The combination of both kinds of results –the externality-free
value benchmark and the obtention of bounds around it– is a way to understand how
externalities might beneﬁt or punish a player in a context where normative principles are
in place. In eﬀect, the two results together provide a range for acceptable Pigouvian-like
transfers (externality-driven taxes or subsidies among players) when eﬃciency is accom-
panied by our other normative desiderata.
To endogenize the coalition structure, in our strategic analysis we consider a two-
stage cooperation process. In the ﬁrst stage, players strategize over which coalition to
join. In the second stage, after a coalition structure has emerged from the ﬁrst, players
commit to cooperate only with those players in the coalition they chose to join. What
is critical to our process is the separation of group formation and payoﬀ distribution in
two sequential steps. Once the payoﬀs are determined for each coalition structure, one
can resort to several techniques to solve the ﬁrst stage of coalition formation. In our
arguments, we use three. First, we focus on dominant partitions. Second, we consider
the core of the corresponding “hedonic game” with externalities. And third, we propose
a simple non-cooperative sequential game of coalition formation.
We ﬁnd that the cooperative process may result in ineﬃcient coalition structures.
While these ineﬃciencies are sometimes due to the externalities, other causes are also
identiﬁed (Examples 11, 12 and 13). The “Coase theorem logic” need not apply in our
framework because the players’ hands are tied by the normative principles behind the
value once coalitions form. On the other hand, we provide suﬃcient conditions on the
partition function under which the grand coalition is eﬃcient and the unique dominant
partition (Propositions 5, 6 and 7). These results (which rely on Propositions 1, 2 and 3,
respectively), are to be compared with the existing literature, where often the formation
of coalitions and the determination of payoﬀs is done simultaneously, resulting in games
that are sometimes rather complex to solve. In contrast, one advantage of our two-stage
process is its simplicity, which should make it useful in applications. Besides simplicity,
the two-stage process is appropriate in scenarios where players’ commitments to coalitions
precede the determination of individual payoﬀs.
2 Deﬁnitions
Let N be the ﬁnite set of players. Coalitions are subsets of N. P(N) denotes the set of all
coalitions, and lower case letters denote the cardinality of coalitions (s = #S, n = #N,
4etc.). A partition of N is a set Π = {(Sk)K
k=1} (1 ≤ K ≤ n) of disjoint coalitions that
cover N, i.e. Si ∩ Sj = ∅, for each 1 ≤ i < j ≤ K, and N = ∪K
k=1Sk. By convention,
{∅} ∈ Π for every partition Π. Elements of a partition are called atoms. A partition Π0
is ﬁner than a partition Π if each atom of Π0 is included in an atom of Π: if S0 ∈ Π0,
then S0 ⊆ S for some S ∈ Π. We will say equivalently that Π is coarser than Π0. An
embedded coalition is a pair (S,Π) where Π is a partition and S is an atom of Π. EC
denotes the set of embedded coalitions. If S is a coalition and i is a member of S, then
S−i (resp. S+i) denotes the set S \ {i} (resp. S ∪ {i}). Similarly, if Π is a partition and
S is an atom of Π, then Π−S denotes the partition Π \ {S} of the set N \ S.
A partition function (Thrall and Lucas (1963)) is a function v that assigns to every
embedded coalition (S,Π) a real number v(S,Π), with the convention v({∅},Π) = 0, for
all Π. Externalities are positive (resp. negative) if v(S,Π) ≥ v(S,Π0) for each embedded
coalitions (S,Π) and (S,Π0) such that Π is coarser (resp. ﬁner) than Π0. There are no
externalities if v(S,Π) = v(S,Π0) for all embedded coalitions (S,Π) and (S,Π0). In the
latter case, a partition function is also called a characteristic function.
A partition function is superadditive if each coalition can achieve as much as the sum
of what its parts can, i.e.
PK
k=1 v(Sk,Π0) ≤ v(S,Π), for every embedded coalition (S,Π),
and every partition {(Sk)K
k=1} of S (1 ≤ K ≤ s), with Π0 = Π−S ∪ {(Sk)K
k=1}.4
A value is a function σ that assigns to every partition function v a unique utility





(s − 1)!(n − s)!
n!
[v(S) − v(S−i)]
for each player i ∈ N and each characteristic function v. In the next sections, we are
concerned with the extension of the theory of the Shapley value to partition functions.
3 Weak Marginality and Multiplicity of Solutions
Based on the marginality principle, Young (1985) proposes a beautiful axiomatization
of the Shapley value for characteristic functions. We shall explore the implications of
4It is well-known that a characteristic function v is superadditive if and only if v(R)+v(T) ≤ v(R∪T),
for every pair (R,T) of disjoint coalitions. In other words, it is suﬃcient to check the case K = 2 in
the absence of externalities. This observation does not extend to partition functions and one needs
to consider all the possible K’s (see Hafalir (2006, Example 1)). Notice that Hafalir (2006) uses the
term “full cohesiveness” to describe superadditivity, while reserving the term “superadditivity” for the
property with K = 2.
5marginality, together with other basic axioms, on the class of partition functions. The
ﬁrst two axioms that we shall impose are hardly controversial.
Anonymity Let π be a permutation of N and let v be a partition function. Then
σ(π(v)) = π(σ(v)), where π(v)(S,Π) = v(π(S),{π(T)|T ∈ Π}) for each embedded coali-
tion (S,Π) and π(x)i = xπ(i) for each x ∈ RN and each i ∈ N.
Eﬃciency
P
i∈N σi(v) = v(N), for each partition function v.
Anonymity means that players’ payoﬀs do not depend on their names. We assume
until Section 8 (included) that the grand coalition forms. Eﬃciency then simply means
that the value must be feasible and exhaust all the beneﬁts from cooperation, given that
everyone cooperates. We will discuss the question of coalition formation in Sections 9 to
12. We will discuss in Section 11 the implications of the eﬃciency property once it is
interpreted as overall eﬃciency on the class of superadditive partition functions.
Next, we turn to our discussion of marginality, central in our work. The marginal
contribution of a player i within a coalition S is deﬁned, for characteristic functions, as
the loss incurred by the other members of S if i leaves the group. This number could
depend on the organization of the players not in S when there are externalities. It is
natural therefore to deﬁne the marginal contribution of a player within each embedded
coalition.
To begin, one may consider the general case where a player may join another coalition
after leaving S. Since many numbers qualify as marginal contributions, the resulting
marginality axiom is rather weak. Still, it coincides with Young’s concept of marginal
contributions in the absence of externalities.
Weak Marginality Let v and v0 be two partition functions. If
v(S,Π) − v(S−i,{S−i,T+i} ∪ Π−S,−T) = v
0(S,Π) − v
0(S−i,{S−i,T+i} ∪ Π−S,−T)
for each embedded coalition (S,Π) such that i ∈ S and each atom T of Π diﬀerent from
S, then σi(v) = σi(v0).
Suppose for instance that N = {i,j,k}. Then player i’s payoﬀ should depend only
on the following seven real numbers:
Ai(v) = v(N,{N}) − v({j,k},{{i},{j,k}}),
Bi(v) = v({i,j},{{i,j},{k}}) − v({j},{{j},{i,k}}),
6Ci(v) = v({i,j},{{i,j},{k}}) − v({j},{{i},{j},{k}}),
Di(v) = v({i,k},{{i,k},{j}}) − v({k},{{k},{i,j}}),
Ei(v) = v({i,k},{{i,k},{j}}) − v({k},{{i},{j},{k}}),
Fi(v) = v({i},{{i},{j,k}}),
Gi(v) = v({i},{{i},{j},{k}}).
For general partition functions, there is no hope to get a characterization result of
a value with Eﬃciency, Anonymity and this weak notion of marginality. To see this,
consider the following examples:
Example 1 The value σα, deﬁned by σα
i (v) := 1
3Ai(v) + 1
6(αBi(v) + (1 − α)Ci(v)) +
1
6(αDi(v) + (1 − α)Ei(v)) + 1
3(αFi(v) + (1 − α)Gi(v)), satisﬁes Anonymity, Eﬃciency,
and Weak Marginality, for every α ∈ R. The values σα are instances of the average
approach characterized by Macho-Stadler et al (2004), as they coincide with the Shapley
value of a ﬁctitious characteristic function vα, where vα({i}) = αv({i},{{i},{j,k}}) +
(1 − α)v({i},{{i},{j},{k}}).
In addition, and what is perhaps more surprising, a large class of non-linear values
satisfy the three axioms. (Recall that they imply linearity in the domain of characteristic
functions.) In this sense, our approach diﬀers substantially from Fujinaka’s (2004). He
proposes several versions of marginality, whereby a marginal contribution is constructed
as a weighted linear average of the marginal contributions over diﬀerent coalition struc-
tures. This assumption already builds linearity in most versions of Fujinaka’s result.




i (v) + m(Fi(v) − Gi(v)) −
m(Ci(v)−Bi(v))+m(Ei(v)−Di(v))
2 , also satisﬁes the three axioms.
Observe that the diﬀerences Ci(v) − Bi(v), Ei(v) − Di(v), and Fi(v) − Gi(v) measure
the externality that the agents face. The function m transforms the externality that a
player faces into a transfer paid equally by the two other players. The value σα,m is then
obtained by adding to σα the net transfer that each player receives.
We shall say that a partition function v is symmetric if π(v)(S,Π) = v(S,Π), for each
embedded coalition (S,Π) and each permutation π of the players. That is, the worth of
an embedded coalition is a function only of its cardinality and of the cardinality of the
other atoms of the partition.
The earlier examples illustrate the large class of linear and non-linear solutions com-
patible with the three axioms. Yet, one can obtain a surprisingly sharp prediction on an
interesting subclass of partition functions. This is the content of our ﬁrst result:
7Proposition 1 Let σ be a value that satisﬁes Anonymity, Eﬃciency and Weak Mar-
ginality. Let u be a symmetric partition function, and let v be a characteristic function.
Then, σi(u + v) =
u(N)
n + Shi(v), for each i ∈ N.
Proof: We proceed by induction, as in Young (1985), but starting the argument with
the symmetric partition function u, instead of the null partition function. The set of
characteristic functions is a vector subspace of the set of partition functions. Consider





1 if S ⊆ S0
0 otherwise.
We prove that for all i ∈ N, σi(u+v) =
u(N)
n +Shi(v) by induction on the number of
non-zero terms appearing in the basis decomposition of v.





n + Shi(v), for each i ∈ N, where the second equality follows from the
fact that σ satisﬁes Anonymity and Eﬃciency.
Suppose now that we have proved the result for all characteristic functions that have





has exactly k + 1 non-zero coeﬃcients. Let S∗ be the intersection of the nonempty
coalitions S for which α(S) 6= 0.
If S∗ = N, the partition function u+v is symmetric. Hence Anonymity and Eﬃciency
for both σ and the Shapley value yield the result.






Player i has the same marginal contributions in u+v and in u+v0. This follows from
the fact that
v(R) − v(R−i) = v
0(R) − v
0(R−i)
8for each coalition R that contains i. Indeed, this equality can be rearranged as follows:
X
S∈P(N) s.t. i/ ∈S and S6=∅
α(S)eS(R) =
X
S∈P(N) s.t. i/ ∈S and S6=∅
α(S)eS(R−i).
Now, going term by term, observe ﬁrst that if S ⊆ R and i 6∈ S, then S ⊆ R−i, and
eS(R) = eS(R−i) = 1. On the other hand, if S 6⊆ R and i 6∈ S, then S 6⊆ R−i either, and
eS(R) = eS(R−i) = 0. Thus, our claim is proven.
Therefore, Weak Marginality implies that σi(u + v) = σi(u + v0). Note that v0 has
at most k non-zero terms in its basis decomposition. The induction hypothesis implies
that σi(u + v) =
u(N)
n + Shi(v0). Weak Marginality for the Shapley value implies that
Shi(v) = Shi(v0). Hence σi(u + v) =
u(N)
n + Shi(v) for each i / ∈ S∗.
Now, for each pair of players i,j ∈ S∗, Anonymity for σ implies that σi(u+v) = σj(u+







i∈N σi(u+v) = u(N)+
P
i∈N Shi(v). Hence σi(u+v) =
u(N)
n +Shi(v), for
each i ∈ S∗, and the proof is complete. 
Proposition 1 is straightforward if v is the null partition function. It coincides with
Young’s (1985) result if u is the null partition function. The important conclusion we
can draw from the proposition is that the three axioms together imply additivity on the
class of partition functions that can be decomposed as the sum of a symmetric partition
function and a characteristic function.5 This result is not trivial, in view of Example 2.
As an illustration of the power of Proposition 1, consider the following example:
Example 3 This example features prominently in Maskin (2003). A similar example
was ﬁrst proposed by Ray and Vohra (1999, Example 1.2). It describes a simple “free
rider” problem created by a public good that can be produced by each two-player coalition.
The set of agents is N = {1,2,3}, and this is the partition function:
v(N) = 24;
v({1,2}) = 12; v({1,3}) = 13; v({2,3}) = 14;
v({i},{{i},{j,k}}) = 9 for all i,j,k;
v({i},{{i},{j},{k}}) = 0 for all i,j,k.
5We argue at the end of Section 5 that a partition function v can be decomposed as the sum of a
symmetric partition function and a characteristic function if and only if externalities are symmetric for
v.
9Observe that this partition function is not symmetric, and it is not a characteristic
function. Yet, it can be decomposed as the sum of a characteristic function v0 (where
each coalition’s worth is zero, except v0({1,3}) = 1 and v0({2,3}) = 2) and a symmetric
partition function u. We conclude that any value σ that satisﬁes Anonymity, Eﬃciency
and Weak Marginality (and we remark this is a large class) must be such that
σ(v) = σ(u + v
0) = (8,8,8) + (−0.5,0,0.5) = (7.5,8,8.5)
in this example.
Next, we wish to consider general partition functions again. Given the large class of
solutions identiﬁed in Examples 1 and 2 above, we propose to follow two alternative paths.
First, we shall strengthen Weak Marginality into a monotonicity property. Second, we
shall look more closely at the notion of “marginal contributions” to propose an alternative
marginality axiom. We undertake each of the alternatives in the next two sections.
4 Monotonicity and Bounds on Payoﬀs
This section investigates what happens when, in addition to requiring Eﬃciency and
Anonymity, Weak Marginality is strengthened to the following monotonicity axiom. The
result will be the derivation of useful bounds to the payoﬀ of each player.
Monotonicity6 Let v and v0 be two partition functions. If
v(S,Π) − v(S−i,{S−i,T+i} ∪ Π−S,−T) ≥ v
0(S,Π) − v
0(S−i,{S−i,T+i} ∪ Π−S,−T)
for each embedded coalition (S,Π) such that i ∈ S and each atom T of Π diﬀerent from
S, then σi(v) ≥ σi(v0).
In words, if for a partition function the vector of marginal contributions of a player
to the diﬀerent coalitions, for any organization of the complement, dominates coordinate
by coordinate that of a second partition function, the value must pay this player more
in the ﬁrst partition function. For instance, the value σα of Example 1 is monotonic, for
each α ∈ [0,1].
6Perhaps the term “Weak Monotonicity” would be more appropriate to emphasize the link with Weak
Marginality, hence comparing all the total eﬀects instead of limiting ourselves to the intrinsic marginal
contributions (see Section 5). Yet, since weak monotonicity has other meanings, and since it will not be
necessary to introduce other monotonicity properties, we opted for the term “monotonicity.”
10First, we point out in the following example that Monotonicity, combined with Anonymity
and Eﬃciency, does not imply additivity either:
Example 4 The value σα,m from Example 2 satisﬁes Monotonicity if α = 1/2, m(x) =
x2 if |x| ≤ 1/12, and m(x) = (1/12)2 if |x| ≥ 1/12.
We may nevertheless bound each player’s payoﬀ from below and from above. The
approach we follow seeks to obtain bounds that rely on decompositions of certain partition
functions into the sum of a symmetric partition function and a characteristic function,
the class of partition functions uncovered in Proposition 1.
Let S be the set of symmetric partition functions and let C be the set of characteristic
functions. Let i ∈ N. For each partition function v, let Mi(v) be the set of pairs
(u,v0) ∈ S × C such that
v(S,Π) − v(S−i,{S−i,T+i} ∪ Π−S,−T)
≥ [u(S,Π) − u(S−i,{S−i,T+i} ∪ Π−S,−T)] + [v0(S) − v0(S−i)]
for each embedded coalition (S,Π) such that i ∈ S and each atom T of Π diﬀerent
from S. Monotonicity and Proposition 1 imply that σi(v) ≥
u(N)
n + Shi(v0), for each
(u,v0) ∈ Mi(v). Therefore, the best lower bound following this approach is obtained by









Similarly, for each partition function v, let Ni(v) be the set of pairs (u,v0) ∈ S × C
such that
v(S,Π) − v(S−i,{S−i,T+i} ∪ Π−S,−T)
≤ [u(S,Π) − u(S−i,{S−i,T+i} ∪ Π−S,−T)] + [v0(S) − v0(S−i)]
for each embedded coalition (S,Π) such that i ∈ S and each atom T of Π diﬀerent from
S. Again, Monotonicity and Proposition 1 imply that σi(v) ≤
u(N)
n + Shi(v0), for each
(u,v0) ∈ Ni(v). The best upper bound following this approach is obtained by solving the








That is, we have shown the following:
11Proposition 2 If σ is a value that satisﬁes Anonymity, Eﬃciency and Monotonicity,
then
σi(v) ∈ [µi(v),νi(v)],
for each i ∈ N.
These bounds in general improve upon those that one could obtain by using only
symmetric partition functions or only characteristic functions (in particular, the “most
pessimistic” and “most optimistic” characteristic functions that each player i can con-
struct from the partition function. Player i’s “most pessimistic” characteristic function
minimizes over Π the worth v(S,Π) of each coalition S where i ∈ S, and maximizes
it for coalitions that do not include i. The opposite happens for his “most optimistic”
characteristic function.)
One important question is whether the bounds provided by Proposition 2 are “tight,”
in the sense that for each partition function one can always ﬁnd solutions to ﬁll up the
entire identiﬁed cube of payoﬀs. Although we do not know the answer to this question
in general, at least for the case of three players the bounds are tight. We will elaborate
on this point in Section 7.
5 Marginality and the Externality-Free Value
An alternative route to Monotonicity is to strengthen Weak Marginality into another
marginality axiom. To do this, it will be instructive to look closer at the concept of
marginal contribution in contexts with externalities.
Consider player i and an embedded coalition (S,Π) with i ∈ S. Suppose player i
leaves coalition S and joins coalition T ∈ Π, T 6= S. One can view this as a two-step
process. In the ﬁrst instance, player i simply leaves S and, at least for a while, he is
alone, which means that for the moment the coalition structure is {S−i,{i}} ∪ Π−S. At
this point, coalition S−i feels the loss of player i’s marginal contribution, i.e.,
v(S,Π) − v(S−i,{S−i,{i}} ∪ Π−S).
In the second step, player i joins coalition T ∈ Π−S, and then S−i is further aﬀected, but
not because of a marginal contribution from player i. Rather, it is aﬀected because of
the corresponding externalities created by this merger, i.e.,
v(S−i,{S−i,{i}} ∪ Π−S) − v(S−i,{S−i,T+i} ∪ Π−S,−T).
12If one views this as an important distinction, one should reserve the term (intrinsic)
marginal contribution to the former diﬀerence. We shall do this in the sequel.
Formally, let i be a player and let (S,Π) be an embedded coalition such that i ∈ S.
Then the (intrinsic) marginal contribution of i to (S,Π) is given by
mc(i,S,Π)(v) = v(S,Π) − v(S−i,{S−i,{i}} ∪ Π−S)
for each partition function v. Player i’s vector of intrinsic marginal contributions is
obtained by varying (S,Π): mci(v) = (mc(i,S,Π))(S,Π)∈EC∧i∈S. Here is the formal statement
of the new marginality axiom for partition functions (note that it also reduces to Young’s
if applied to characteristic functions).
Marginality Let i be a player and let v and v0 be two partition functions. If mci(v) =
mci(v0), then σi(v) = σi(v0).





for each player i ∈ N and each partition function v, where v∗ is the ﬁctitious characteristic
function deﬁned as follows:
v
∗(S) := v(S,{S,{j}j∈N\S})
for each coalition S.
We call this the externality-free value, and we shall discuss it below. Our next result
follows.
Proposition 3 σ∗ is the unique value satisfying Anonymity, Eﬃciency and Marginality.
Proof: The set of partition functions form a vector space. We prove the proposition by
deﬁning an adequate basis. Let (S,Π) be an embedded coalition, where S is non-empty.





1 if S ⊆ S0 and (∀T 0 ∈ Π0 \ {S0})(∃T ∈ Π) : T 0 ⊆ T,
0 otherwise.
Lemma 1 The collection of vectors (e(S,Π))(S,Π)∈EC constitutes a basis of the space of
partition functions.
13Proof of Lemma 1: The number of vectors in the collection equals the dimension of the
space. It remains to show that they are linearly independent, i.e.
X
(S,Π)∈EC
α(S,Π)e(S,Π) = 0 (1)
implies α(S,Π) = 0 for each (S,Π) ∈ EC.
Suppose on the contrary that there exists a collection (α(S,Π))(S,Π)∈EC of real numbers
satisfying (1) and such that α(S,Π) 6= 0, for some (S,Π) ∈ EC. Let (S∗,Π∗) be an
embedded coalition such that:
1. α(S∗,Π∗) 6= 0;
2. (∀(S,Π) ∈ EC) : S ( S∗ ⇒ α(S,Π) = 0;
3. (∀(S∗,Π) ∈ EC s.t. Π 6= Π∗) : Π coarser than Π∗ ⇒ α(S∗,Π) = 0.
By deﬁnition, e(S,Π)(S∗,Π∗) = 0 if S is not included in S∗. The second property of













By deﬁnition, e(S∗,Π)(S∗,Π∗) = 0 if Π is not coarser than Π∗. The third property of










Equation (1) thus implies that α(S∗,Π∗) = 0, a contradiction. 
Now we continue with the proof of Proposition 3. The properties of the Shapley value
imply that σ∗ satisﬁes the three axioms.
For uniqueness, let σ be a value satisfying the three axioms. We show that σ(v) =
σ∗(v) for each partition function v by induction on the number of non-zero terms appear-
ing in the basis decomposition of v.
Suppose ﬁrst that v = αe(S,Π), for some α ∈ R and some (S,Π) ∈ EC. Let i ∈ N \ S
and let (S0,Π0) be any embedded coalition. The two following statements are equivalent:
1. S ⊆ S0 and (∀T 0 ∈ Π0
−S0)(∃T ∈ Π) : T 0 ⊆ T;
142. S ⊆ S0 \ {i} and (∀T 0 ∈ {{i},Π0
−S0})(∃T ∈ Π) : T 0 ⊆ T.
Hence e(S,Π)(S0,Π0) = 1 if and only if e(S,Π)(S0
−i,{S0
−i,{i},Π0
−S0}) = 1. So, mci(v) =
mci(v0), where v0 is the null partition function (i.e., v0(S,Π) = 0 for each (S,Π) ∈ EC).
Marginality implies that σi(v) = σi(v0). Anonymity and Eﬃciency imply that σi(v0) = 0.
Hence σi(v) = 0 = σ∗
i(v). Anonymity implies in addition that σj(v) = σk(v) and σ∗
j(v) =
σ∗
k(v), for all j,k in S. Hence σ(v) = σ∗(v), since both σ and σ∗ satisfy Eﬃciency.
Suppose now that we have proved the result for all the partition functions that have





be a partition function with exactly k+1 non-zero coeﬃcients. Let S∗ be the intersection
of the coalitions S for which there exists a partition Π such that α(S,Π) is diﬀerent from
zero. If i ∈ N \ S∗, then player i’s marginal contribution vector in v coincides with his






Marginality implies that σi(v) = σi(v0). Note that the number of non-zero terms in the
basis decomposition of v0 is at most k. Then, by the induction hypothesis, σi(v0) = σ∗
i(v0).
Since σ∗ satisﬁes Marginality as well, we conclude that σi(v) = σ∗
i(v). Anonymity implies
in addition that σj(v) = σk(v) and σ∗
j(v) = σ∗
k(v), for all j,k in S∗. Hence σ(v) = σ∗(v),
since both σ and σ∗ satisfy Eﬃciency. The proof of Proposition 3 is now complete. 
Marginality does not imply on its own that externalities play no role in the com-
putation of payoﬀs. Indeed, a player’s intrinsic marginal contribution to an embedded
coalition (S,Π) depends on the composition of Π−S. Instead, it is the combination of
Marginality, Eﬃciency, and Anonymity that leads to the externality-free value. Hence,
Proposition 3 is deﬁnitely not a trivial variation on Young’s (1985) original theorem:
some information present in the partition function has to be discarded, as a consequence
of the combination of the three axioms. To gain an intuition for this, consider ﬁrst a
three-player partition function. The result tells us that player 1’s payoﬀ does not de-
pend on x = v({1},{{1},{2,3}}). This does not follow from any of the three axioms
taken separately (in particular, by Marginality it could depend on x, if S = {1} and
Π−S = {{2,3}} in the deﬁnition of the axiom). Instead, the reasoning goes as follows.
15Players 2 and 3’s payoﬀs do not depend on x according to Marginality. Eﬃciency then
implies that player 1’s payoﬀ cannot depend on x either.
To strengthen one’s intuition, let us pursue this heuristic argument with four players.
In principle, player 1’s payoﬀ could depend on ﬁfteen numbers according to Marginality.
Only eight of them are actually relevant to compute σ∗. Let us show for instance why
player 1’s payoﬀ cannot depend on y = v({1},{{1},{2,3},{4}}). Marginality implies
that, apart from player 1’s, only the payoﬀ of player 4 could depend on y, or more
precisely on z −y, where z = v({1,4},{{1,4},{2,3}}). Marginality implies also that the
payoﬀs of players 2 and 3 do not depend on z. On the other hand, as we know from
Proposition 3, the three axioms together imply that the solution must be an anonymous
and additive function. Thus, the payoﬀs of players 1 and 4 depend identically on z (if z
increases, both payoﬀs to players 1 and 4 also increase). Hence, Eﬃciency implies that
player 4’s payoﬀ cannot depend on z, and therefore not on y either. Players 2 and 3’s
payoﬀs do not depend on y by Marginality. Hence player 1’s payoﬀ cannot depend on y,
by Eﬃciency.
We regard the externality-free value σ∗ as a fair compromise that takes into account
the pure or intrinsic marginal contributions of players to coalitions, stripped down from
externality components. Note also that σ∗ satisﬁes Monotonicity. Then, the range of
payoﬀs identiﬁed in Proposition 2 for each player captures how externalities aﬀect his
payoﬀ, when one still requires Eﬃciency, Anonymity and Monotonicity. Thus, the size
of the diﬀerence νi(v) − σ∗
i(v) expresses the maximum “subsidy” or beneﬁt to player i,
associated with externalities that favor him, and the diﬀerence σ∗
i(v) − µi(v) represents
how much i can be “taxed” or suﬀer, due to harmful externalities, in a value that obeys
these three axioms.
In the same way that σ∗ serves as an interesting reference point in the space of payoﬀs,
the characteristic function v∗ can serve as an interesting reference point to measure the
size of externalities. Let us deﬁne the externality index v(S,Π) associated to (S,Π) as
the diﬀerence v(S,Π) − v∗(S) (same as in Example 2 and in Section 7).7 We can now
better understand the class of partition functions that was uncovered in Proposition 1
and that plays a key role in many parts of our paper. Externalities are symmetric for v if
the associated externality indices (v(S,Π))(S,Π)∈EC form a symmetric partition function,
i.e. the level of externality associated to any embedded coalition (S,Π) depends only
on the cardinality of S and on the cardinality of the other atoms of Π. It is then not
7Any diﬀerence v(S,Π) − v(S,Π0) can be recovered from our externality indices, since v(S,Π) −
v(S,Π0) = v(S,Π) − v(S,Π0).
16diﬃcult to check that a partition function can be decomposed as the sum of a symmetric
partition function and a characteristic function if and only if externalities are symmetric
for v. Example 3 provides an illustration of this equivalence.
6 Alternative Approaches to the Externality-Free Value
A natural adaptation of Shapley’s original axiomatic system also leads to the externality-
free value σ∗. Let i be a player and let v be a partition function. We say that player i
is null in v if his marginal contribution to any embedded coalition is nihil: mci(v) = 0.
Note how this notion of a null player disregards externalities, as only intrinsic marginal
contributions matter.
Null Player Let v be a partition function. If player i is null in v, then σi(v) = 0.
Additivity Let v and w be two partition functions. Then, σ(v + w) = σ(v) + σ(w).
A null player must receive a zero payoﬀ, according to the ﬁrst axiom. Additivity
essentially amounts to the linearity of the value.8 It expresses a form of mathematical
simplicity by requiring a strong speciﬁc functional form.
Proposition 4 σ∗ is the unique value satisfying Anonymity, Eﬃciency, Null Player and
Additivity.
Proof: The properties of the Shapley value imply that σ∗ satisﬁes the four axioms.
Let σ be a value satisfying the four axioms, and let v be a partition function. Re-





for some real numbers α(S,Π). Anonymity, Null Player, and Eﬃciency imply that
σ(α(S,Π)e(S,Π)) = σ∗(α(S,Π)e(S,Π)), for each (S,Π) ∈ EC (a similar argument was
made in the proof of Proposition 3). Since both σ and σ∗ are additive, we conclude that
σ(v) = σ∗(v). 
Proposition 4 is equivalent to theorem 2 of Pham Do and Norde (2007). However,
their proof relies on the canonical basis instead of using the basis identiﬁed in Lemma 1.
8To be precise, it implies linearity only with respect to linear combinations involving rational numbers.
17Our basis has the advantage of allowing to prove a similar result on the smaller class of
superadditive partition functions (see the discussion at the end of Section 11).
A player is null if his vector of marginal contributions is nihil. The other notion of
marginal contributions, which contained the externality eﬀects and was used to deﬁne
Weak Marginality, leads in turn to a weaker version of the null player property. Player i
is null in the strong sense if
v(S,Π) − v(S−i,{S−i,T+i} ∪ Π−S,−T) = 0
for each embedded coalition (S,Π) such that i ∈ S and each atom T of Π diﬀerent from S.
Clearly, if player i is null in the strong sense, then he is null. One can use this deﬁnition
to propose a diﬀerent null player axiom:
Weak Version of the Null Player Axiom Let i ∈ N and let v be a partition function.
If player i is null in the strong sense, then σi(v) = 0.
This is equivalent to the dummy player axiom of Bolger (1989) and Macho-Stadler et
al (2004).9 Macho-Stadler et al (2004, theorem 1) show that any solution that satisﬁes
this version of the null player axiom, as well as the axioms of eﬃciency, linearity and
(a strong version of) Anonymity is a Shapley value of a characteristic function that is
obtained by performing averages of the partition function. Our externality-free value σ∗
belongs to this class of solutions. Macho-Stadler et al also characterize a unique solution
by adding an axiom of similar inﬂuence that σ∗ does not satisfy.
In light of our ﬁrst discussion concerning even non-linear solutions (recall Example 2),
we prefer Proposition 3 to Proposition 4 (even though both lead to the same value), be-
cause we ﬁnd Marginality more compelling than Additivity. It is easier to interpret and
justify a restriction on the set of variables required to compute the players’ payoﬀs, than
to impose a speciﬁc functional form. It is interesting to note in that respect that the
non-additive solution deﬁned in Example 4 satisﬁes the strong symmetry and the simi-
lar inﬂuence axioms of Macho-Stadler et al (2004), in addition to satisfying Anonymity,
Eﬃciency, and Weak Marginality. Once again, Additivity cannot be justiﬁed by the
marginality principle that underlies their dummy player axiom (the weak version of mar-
9Bolger and Macho-Stadler et al say that player i is dummy if v(S,Π) = v(S0,Π0) for each (S,Π) and
each (S0,Π0) that can be deduced from (S,Π) by changing player i’s aﬃliation. This clearly implies that
player i is null in our strong sense. The converse is straightforward after proving that v(S,Π) = v(S,Π0)
for each pair of embedded coalitions (S,Π) and (S,Π0) such that i 6∈ S and (S,Π0) can be deduced from
(S,Π) by changing only player i’s aﬃliation. Indeed, if i is null in our strong sense, then v(S,Π) =
v(S+i,{S+i} ∪ {T−i|T ∈ Π−S}) = v(S+i,{S+i} ∪ {T−i|T ∈ Π0
−S}) = v(S,Π0).
18ginality), even if one imposes their other requirements.
One can take a bargaining approach to understand the Shapley value. This was
done for instance in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) or P´ erez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001)
for characteristic functions. It is not diﬃcult to see that we obtain σ∗ if we apply these
procedures to superadditive partition functions. Indeed, it is assumed in these two papers
that, when a proposal is rejected, the proposer goes oﬀ by himself and does not form a
coalition with anyone else. We leave the details to the interested reader. Other new rules
concerning the rejected proposers would lead to values that treat externalities diﬀerently
(see Macho-Stadler et al (2005)).
Myerson’s (1980) principle of balanced contributions (or the related concept of poten-
tial proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989)) oﬀers another elegant justiﬁcation for the
Shapley value. Instead of characterizing a value, i.e. a function that determines a payoﬀ
vector for each characteristic function, Myerson characterizes a payoﬀ conﬁguration, i.e.
a vector that determines how the members of each coalition would share the surplus
that is created should they cooperate. A payoﬀ conﬁguration satisﬁes the principle of
balanced contributions if, for any two members i,j of any coalition S, the payoﬀ loss that
player i suﬀers if player j leaves S equals the payoﬀ loss that player j suﬀers if player
i leaves S. This principle, combined with eﬃciency within each coalition, implies that
the players agree on the Shapley value within the grand coalition. This methodology can
be easily extended to partition functions. As was the case with our analysis of Young’s
marginal contributions, the payoﬀ loss that a player i suﬀers if a player j leaves S usually
depends on what i does after leaving S (stay on his own, or join another atom and,
if so, which one?). It may be worthwhile to study diﬀerent scenarios. Here we simply
observe that if a player is assumed to stay on his own after leaving a coalition (as was
the case for our concept of intrinsic marginal contribution), then the extended principle
of balanced contributions ` a la Myerson leads to a unique payoﬀ conﬁguration, and the
resulting payoﬀ for the grand coalition coincides once again with the payoﬀ associated to
the externality-free value. We again leave the details to the interested reader.
Section 5 and the current section together lead to an apparent conclusion. Suppose
one simply wishes to ﬁnd an extension of the Shapley value to environments with ex-
ternalities by using any of the diﬀerent approaches that have provided its foundations
on the domain of characteristic functions. Then, the result is the externality-free value,
using our intrinsic marginal contributions as the parallel concept to the standard mar-
ginal contributions of the reduced domain. But in dealing with externalities, any such
approach must be complemented by a treatment of the externalities themselves, and that
19is what has led to the bounds around the externality-free value.
7 The Tightness of the Bounds on Payoﬀs
We now come back to the bounds obtained in Proposition 2, and how they are positioned
relative to the externality-free value. In particular, we argue that for the class of three-
player partition functions, the bounds obtained are tight. By solving the linear programs














i(v) is player i’s externality-free value payoﬀ and i(v) = v({i},{{i},{j,k}}) −
v({i},{{i},{j},{k}}) is the externality index associated to player i. Notice that it is not
the sign nor the magnitude of i(v) that determine the bounds on player i’s payoﬀ, but
instead how far i(v) is from j(v) and k(v).
Thus, suppose there are three players, and let σ be a value that satisﬁes Anonymity,
Eﬃciency, and Monotonicity. Let v be a partition function. Suppose without loss of










Here, σ0 and σ1 are the solutions σα of Example 1 for the cases of α = 0 and α = 1,
respectively (σ0 = σ∗). The bounds are intuitive. For the player who beneﬁts the
least from externalities (player 1), the lowest possible payoﬀ compatible with the axioms
happens at the Shapley value of the average characteristic function that puts all the weight
on his worth when players 2 and 3 cooperate. His highest possible payoﬀ is obtained at
the Shapley value of the average characteristic function which his worth corresponds to
the situation in which players 2 and 3 do not cooperate. Exactly the opposite happens
for player 3, who beneﬁts the most from externalities.
Therefore, the bounds we obtained are tight in the following sense. There exists a
value (e.g. σ0 or σ1) that satisﬁes Anonymity, Eﬃciency, and Monotonicity, and such
that, for each partition function v, some player i gets µi(v) and some player j gets νj(v),
the bounds of Proposition 2. The next two examples further illustrate the tightness of
20the bounds.
Example 5 Consider a variant of Example 3, in which player 1 is the only agent capable
of free-riding from a two-player coalition, receiving a worth of 9, as before, when coalition
{2,3} gets together. However,
v({2},{{2},{1,3}}) = v({3},{{3},{1,2}}) = 0.
One can easily check that σ0(v) = σ∗(v) = (7.5,8,8.5), σ1(v) = (10.5,6.5,7), and that
the bounds from Proposition 2 are:
µ1(v) = 7.5, ν1(v) = 10.5;
µ2(v) = 6.5, ν2(v) = 8;
µ3(v) = 7, ν3(v) = 8.5.
That is, no monotonic solution σ ever punishes player 1 or rewards 2 and 3 with respect
to the payoﬀs in σ∗. Given the nature of externalities in this example (player 1 is the only
one who beneﬁts from externalities), it is clear what direction externality-driven transfers
should take for each player.
In the next example, we show that the cube of payoﬀs identiﬁed by our bounds
contains payoﬀs associated with non-linear solutions, which cannot be obtained through
Monotonicity in the “average approach” of Macho-Stadler et al (2004). We also show
that the axioms may imply restrictions on the players’ payoﬀs that are not captured by
the bounds.
Example 6 Consider the following partition function:
v(N) = 1;




v({i},{{i},{j},{k}}) = 0 for all i,j,k.


































Using α = 0 in the average approach gives the externality-free value, which yields equal
split of surplus: σ∗(v) = (1/3,1/3,1/3). On the other hand, if α = 1, the corresponding





40). Player 2 actually receives 1/3
according to every monotonic value obtained from the average approach.





















Here, the transfers driven by externalities do not cancel out for player 2, because they
enter non-linearly in the solution. Non-linear solutions are far more complex than their
linear counterparts, as the next paragraph will suggest.
Let’s rescale up the partition function of this example through multiplying it by 60.
Call the resulting partition function v0. The new bounds are:
µ1(v
0) = 20, ν1(v
0) = 21.5;
µ2(v
0) = 19.5, ν2(v
0) = 20.5;
µ3(v
0) = 18.5, ν3(v
0) = 20.
The average approach, under α = 0, yields σ∗(v0) = (20,20,20). With α = 1, it yields
σ1(v0) = (21.5,20,18.5). Again, every monotonic average approach value will pay player
2 exactly 20. That is, so far everything has been rescaled up by the same factor of 60.
However, consider our monotonic solution of Example 4. It yields
σ
α,m(v










which does not preserve the rescaling and which, more interestingly, changes the nature
of transfers across agents vis-` a-vis the externality-free payoﬀ.
The partition function v also illustrates another point. Let v00 be the partition function
22obtained from v by increasing the surplus of agent 2 to 1/10 when he free-rides. If the
value is monotonic, then player 2’s payoﬀ is larger in v00 than in v, while player 1’s payoﬀ
is larger in v than in v00. On the other hand, if the value is anonymous, then players
1 and 2 must receive the same payoﬀs in v00. Hence player 1’s payoﬀ is larger than
player 2’s payoﬀ in v. This conclusion cannot be reached by comparing the bounds, since
ν2(v) > µ1(v). Hence it is possible, for some partition functions, to reach conclusions
regarding the players’ payoﬀs that are not captured by the bounds.
Another observation in support of the tightness of our bounds is that νi(v) ≤ v(N)−
µj(v) − µk(v) and that µi(v) ≥ v(N) − νj(v) − νk(v) (for each i,j,k). The easy proof is
left to the interested reader.
For more than three players, we do not know how tight the bounds of Proposition 2
are. However, in many examples, they provide an insightful reﬁnement of the set of
feasible payoﬀs.
8 Comparisons with the Axiomatic Literature
In this section we present some examples to draw comparisons with previous axiomatic
approaches in the literature.
Myerson (1977) proposes the ﬁrst value for partition functions. His key axiom is a
version of the carrier axiom, used also in the domain of characteristic functions. This
value violates Monotonicity and sometimes yields unintuitive predictions.
Example 7 Consider the three-player partition function v where v({1},{{1},{2,3}}) =
1 = v(N) and v(S,Π) = 0 otherwise. Myerson’s value, (1,0,0), falls outside of our cube
of payoﬀs ( [1/3,2/3] for player 1, and [1/6,1/3] for players 2 and 3). Hence Myerson’s
value is not monotonic.
In a second three-player partition function, where v(N) = v({1},{{1},{2},{3}}) = 1
and v(S,Π) = 0 otherwise, Myerson’s value assigns the payoﬀs (0,1/2,1/2). Again, this
falls outside of our range of payoﬀs, which is the same as before.
The cube of payoﬀs compatible with Monotonicity is the same for both partition func-
tions. However, the externality-free value and the direction of the externality-based trans-
fers do vary. The externality-free value yields (1/3,1/3,1/3) in the ﬁrst partition func-
tion, and taking into account externality-based transfers in monotonic values can only
help player 1 at the expense of either player 2 or 3 – positive externalities on 1 when 2
and 3 cooperate. In contrast, σ∗ yields (2/3,1/6,1/6) in the second partition function,
23and taking externalities into account can only hurt player 1 to favor 2 and 3 – negative
externalities for 1 when 2 and 3 get together.
Bolger’s (1989) work is based on the additivity axiom, yet he characterizes a unique
value, while using the weak dummy axiom as in Macho-Stadler et al (2004), by intro-
ducing an axiom of (expected) marginality. Bolger applies this axiom only on the class
of “simple games.” The expectation is computed by assuming that a player has an equal
chance of joining any of the other atoms when he is leaving a group. Macho-Stadler et
al (2004) show that Bolger’s value cannot be obtained through the “average approach”
and that it violates their axioms of strong symmetry and similar inﬂuence. Clearly, it
also violates our null player axiom.
Example 8 Consider the following three-player partition function, where
v(N) = v({2,3}) = 1;
v({1,2}) = v({1,3}) = 1/2;
v({2},{{1},{2},{3}}) = a, v({3},{{1},{2},{3}}) = a;
v({2},{{2},{1,3}}) = 1 − a, v({3},{{3},{1,2}}) = 1 − a;
v({1},{{1},{2},{3}}) = v({1},{{1},{2,3}}) = 0.
Because of the expected marginality axiom, player 1 is null “in average”: for exam-
ple, if he abandons coalition {1,2} and there is equal probability of him being alone or
joining player 3, his expected marginal contribution (as deﬁned by Bolger) to player 2 is
0. Bolger’s value assigns to this partition function the payoﬀs (0,1/2,1/2). This is true












That is, as a increases, the externality-free value transfers surplus from player 1 to players
2 and 3.

























So, if externalities are to be taken into account in the determination of the solution, play-
ers 2 and 3 should expect positive transfers from player 1, with respect to the externality-
free value.
However, the opposite happens if a > 1/2:
µ1(v) = σ
∗



















, ν3(v) = σ
∗
3(v).
Macho-Stadler et al (2004) use a “similar inﬂuence” axiom to uniquely characterize
a value within the class of solutions that they term the “average approach.” In the
previous example, the value identiﬁed by Macho-Stadler et al coincides with Bolger’s
and hence, it is insensitive to the parameter a.10 To better understand the diﬀerences
between Macho-Stadler et al’s and our approach, here is another example.
Example 9 Suppose there are 101 players. Let v(N) = v({1},{{i}i∈N}) = 1 and
v(S,Π) = 0 otherwise. Macho-Stadler et al’s value coincides with the Shapley value
of the average characteristic function ¯ v, where ¯ v({1}) = 1/100!, a very small positive
number. Their value thus prescribes something extremely close to equal split, paying
about 1/101 per player (player 1 getting a tiny bit more than the others). According to
our approach, the externality-free value pays 2/101 to player 1, and 99/10100 to each
of the others. Player 1 gets more than double of the share of the others if one ignores
externalities. Our cube allows the range of payoﬀs for player 1 to vary between 1/101
and 2/101, underlining the fact that he will have to worry about making transfers to the
others to bribe them not to cooperate. For the others, the range of payoﬀs places the
externality-free value at the bottom, from which they can only improve through transfers
from player 1. This seems to capture better what’s going on in the problem. Indeed, the
partition function is “strongly asymmetric” from player 1’s point of view, and so it is
counterintuitive to prescribe essentially the equal split, as the Macho-Stadler et al value
does. Our cube of payoﬀs and the position of σ∗ in it seem to better capture the “strong
10The same payoﬀ is prescribed for that partition function by the value proposed by Albizuri et
al (2005), because of their embedded coalition anonymity axiom. This value is one of the “average
approach” values of Macho-Stadler et al (2004).
25asymmetry” of the partition function.
Fujinaka (2004) introduces diﬀerent notions of marginalism, using exogenous weights
to aggregate the diﬀerent scenarios that could follow the departure of a coalitional mem-
ber. Particularly, his axiom boils down to Marginality if one puts all the weight on the
scenario where a player stays on his own after leaving a coalition. Hence it appears that
Fujinaka obtained independently a result similar to our third proposition. His proof dif-
fers substancially from ours and does not make use of the basis we uncovered in Lemma
1. It is not clear whether his proof can be adapted to apply on the important subclass
of superadditive partition functions, as ours does (see Section 11). Our decomposition of
the total eﬀect into the intrinsic marginal contribution and the externality eﬀect at the
beginning of Section 5 shows that, if one has to choose one speciﬁc scenario within the
class of scenarios considered by Fujinaka, the one where a player stays on his own after
leaving a coalition is well motivated and appealing. Actually, many of Fujinaka’s values
are not monotonic.
Example 10 Consider the partition function from Example 5. Recall that Eﬃciency,
Anonymity and Monotonicity of σ determine the following payoﬀ intervals:
σ1(v) ∈ [7.5,10.5]; σ2(v) ∈ [6.5,8]; σ3(v) ∈ [7,8.5].
Using Fujinaka’s notation, consider the case where αi({j},{{j},{i},{k}}) = −1, and
αi({j},{{j},{i,k}}) = 2. The associated value yields the payoﬀ (13.5,5,5.5), which falls
outside the cube.
Maskin (2003) also provides an axiomatic treatment of coalitional problems with ex-
ternalities, although his axioms are best understood in the context of his speciﬁc strategic
model. The best comparison between his work and ours is drawn from our coalition for-
mation analysis, in the sequel.
9 Moving Away from the Grand Coalition:
Other Exogenous Coalition Structures
Thus far we have been assuming that the grand coalition forms. We want to relax this
assumption. We assume in this section that a speciﬁc coalition structure has formed, for
some exogenous reasons, while leaving the endogenous formation of coalitions, and its
implications in terms of eﬃciency, for the next section.
26Suppose that a coalition structure Π, not necessarily the grand coalition, has materi-
alized. All our previous results can now be applied to each atom S of Π in the following
way. An (S,Π)-value is a function σ(S,Π) that assigns to every partition function v (de-
ﬁned for N, as before) a unique utility vector σ(S,Π)(v) ∈ RS. It is then straightforward
to phrase the properties of (S,Π)-Anonymity, (S,Π)-Eﬃciency, Weak (S,Π)-Marginality,
(S,Π)-Monotonicity, and (S,Π)-Marginality, simply by thinking of S as a grand coalition





i (v) = v(S,Π). The details are left to the interested reader.






(t − 1)!(s − t)!
s!
[v(T) − v(T−i)]
for each player i ∈ S, and each characteristic function v deﬁned over S.
Proposition 1’ Let σ(S,Π) be an (S,Π)-value that satisﬁes (S,Π)-Anonymity, (S,Π)-
Eﬃciency, and Weak (S,Π)-Marginality. Let u be a symmetric partition function, and





i (vS), where vS is the
reduced characteristic function deﬁned over S by vS(T) = v(T), for each T ∈ P(S).
A slightly stronger result holds, as symmetry for u and the absence of externalities
for v can be required over S only. We will not need such a stronger result in the remain-
der, and so we prefer instead to keep notation simple. Combining Proposition 1’ with




i , computed as in Section 4.









for each i ∈ S.
For each partition function v, let v∗
(S,Π) be the ﬁctitious characteristic function deﬁned
over S as follows:
v
∗
(S,Π)(T) = v(T,{T} ∪ {{j}j∈S\T} ∪ Π−S)







27for each partition function v.




Our next task is to suggest how one could endogenize the coalition structure. We propose
an explanation based on a two-stage process. The players ﬁrst decide with whom they
want to cooperate. The outcome of this ﬁrst stage is a coalition structure Π. Payoﬀs are
then determined within each atom of Π in the second stage. Diﬀerent scenarios come to
mind for determining the payoﬀs. One could think for instance of many explicit bargain-
ing procedures, although here we will pursue a reduced form approach using the results
listed in the previous section.11 To summarize, players strategize across the board when
forming coalitions, but are bound by the partition itself once the coalitions are formed.
Apart from the simplicity of the analysis, this two-stage process may describe some rel-
evant scenarios, in which players’ commitments to coalitions precede the determination
of individual payoﬀs.
Let x be the function that summarizes the outcome of the second stage of the game.
It is thus a function that associates a vector in RN to each coalition structure. With our




for each coalition structure Π, and each player i, with S being the atom of Π to which i
belongs.
We focus now on the question of coalition formation. One advantage of our approach
is the relative simplicity of this problem, because the players’ ﬁnal payoﬀs are given as
a function of the coalitions that form.12 Still, diﬀerent bargaining scenarios may lead to
11Yet, the methodology we develop is independent of the axioms. Interesting conclusions can be
reached by applying alternative scenarios to solve the second stage. What is key to our reasoning is the
two-stage cooperation process.
12In the absence of externalities, i.e. when xi(Π) = xi(Π0) for each i and each Π and Π0 such that the
atoms to which i belongs are the same in both partitions, these problems of coalition formation have
been referred to as “hedonic games.” If one likes this terminology, then our problem could be referred
to as an hedonic game with externalities.
28diﬀerent outcomes. We articulate our arguments around three solutions.
(i) The ﬁrst solution is extremely appealing, when it exists. Coalition S is strictly




for each i ∈ S, each partition Π that contains S, and each partition Π0 that does not
contain S. If S is strictly dominant, we can be conﬁdent that it will form in frictionless
bargaining scenarios.13 Assuming that S forms, there may now be another coalition that
is strictly dominant for the remaining players (i.e. in N \ S). Continuing in this fashion
may lead to a unique partition. A partition Π is strictly dominant if it is obtained by the
iterative formation of strictly dominant coalitions. Clearly, a strictly dominant partition
often fails to exist, but if there is one such partition, then it is unique.
(ii) The core is our second solution to the coalition formation stage. A coalition S
blocks a partition Π0 if
xi(Π) > xi(Π
0)
for each i ∈ S and each partition Π that contains S. The core is the set of partitions that
are not blocked by any coalition. Instead of trying to determine the partition that will
form, we eliminate those that are unstable. We want to eliminate with conﬁdence and
this is why we require the members of the objecting coalitions to be better oﬀ whatever
the other players do after the deviation.14Any other expectation when considering the
formation of an objecting coalition would lead to a smaller core. If there is a strictly
dominant partition, then this is the only partition in the core. When there is no such
partition, then the core may be empty (Shenoy (1979, example 7.5)) or may contain more
than one partition.
(iii) The third solution we suggest is based on a speciﬁc non-cooperative bargaining
scenario. Fix an order π for the players in N. Following the order π, each player i ∈ N
announces a coalition S that contains i. The outcome of this sequential move game of
perfect information is a coalition structure, in which a coalition S forms if and only if each
player in S has announced the coalition S. If there is a strictly dominant partition, then
this is the equilibrium outcome for every order of the players. The proposed coalition
formation game is a ﬁnite horizon extensive form of perfect information. It admits at
13This impression is conﬁrmed by our two other solutions. If a coalition structure Π belongs to our
second or third solution, and S is strictly dominant, then S ∈ Π.
14Such a construction is reminiscent of the maximin (or α-) representations of games in strategic form.
29least one subgame perfect equilibrium15 and it is “almost always” unique.16 On the other
hand, the equilibrium outcome may depend on the ordering of the players.
10.1 Ineﬃciency and its Causes
We are now ready to draw some qualitative conclusions about the outcomes of our two-
stage cooperation process. Our ﬁrst observation is that ineﬃciency may be entirely due
to the presence of externalities in some situations.
Example 11 Consider again the partition function of Example 3, which describes a basic
free-rider problem:
v(N) = 24;
v({1,2}) = 12; v({1,3}) = 13; v({2,3}) = 14;
v({i},{{i},{j,k}}) = 9 for all i,j,k;
v({i},{{i},{j},{k}}) = 0 for all i,j,k.
Suppose that the value σ(S,Π) satisfy (S,Π)-Anonymity, (S,Π)-Eﬃciency and Weak (S,Π)-
Marginality, for each embedded coalition (S,Π). Our previous analysis implies that the






There is no strictly dominant partition. The core of the coalition formation problem is
{{N},{{1},{2,3}},{{2},{1,3}},{{3},{1,2}}}.
Apart from each of the three partitions containing a two-player coalition and the free
15Hence the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes associated to this class of bargaining procedures
do not necessarily belong to the core (as the core may be empty).
16If each player’s payoﬀs at the terminal nodes are diﬀerent, then there exists a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium, which coincides with the backwards induction outcome.
30rider as a singleton, the grand coalition is also stable because of our very conservative
deﬁnition of blocking: an individual player does not block because he is afraid of the
“incredible threat” posed by the two-player coalition, i.e., that they will not cooperate
after he leaves. Our third solution takes care of this. Whatever the order π, the coalition
structure predicted by the unique subgame perfect equilibrium has the ﬁrst mover alone
in his singleton coalition, rationally anticipating that after he chooses to be alone, the
other two will join together in the two-player coalition, as will surely happen. Of course,
the speciﬁc coalition structure that emerges from the sequential game depends on the
order, which assigns diﬀerent bargaining power to players as a function of how early
they speak in the game: each of the partitions containing a two-player coalition is the
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game for a given ordering. On the other
hand, v is superadditive, and hence the eﬃcient coalition structure is the grand coalition.
The outcome of our two-stage cooperation process admits ineﬃcient partitions (and in
the case of the sequential game, it consists exclusively of ineﬃcient partitions). This
conclusion is robust, as it holds for diﬀerent solution concepts in the coalition formation
stage, and does not rely on strong assumptions concerning the list of appropriate values.
Here, note how the “Coase theorem logic” does not work to solve ineﬃciencies by means
of bargaining: the application of normative criteria within each coalition ties the players’
hands while negotiating to form coalitions.





0({1,2}) = 12; v




0({i},{{i},{j},{k}}) = 0 for all i,j,k.
This is a characteristic function. Hence the outcomes obtained by applying the list of












31The eﬃcient coalition structure, {N}, is now strictly dominant and is thus expected to be
the outcome of most bargaining scenarios for the coalition formation stage. We conclude
that the ineﬃciency may be entirely attributed to the presence of externalities in some
situations.
Our second observation is that the presence of externalities is not necessarily the only
factor responsible for ineﬃciency. We elaborate on this point in the next two examples.
Example 12 Consider the partition function in Example 5. Suppose that the value σ(S,Π)
satisfy (S,Π)-Anonymity, (S,Π)-Eﬃciency and (S,Π)-Monotonicity, for each embedded
coalition (S,Π). Our previous analysis implies that the payoﬀs in the second stage are:





Hence, one anticipates that diﬀerent normative principles will lead to diﬀerent coalition
structures. To simplify the discussion, let us focus on the linear solutions introduced in
Example 1. For instance, suppose that σ0 (or σ∗) is the relevant solution to apply. The
players’ payoﬀs if the grand coalition forms are thus (7.5,8,8.5). There is no strictly
dominant partition. The core of the coalition formation game consists of the partitions
{{N},{{1},{2,3}}}. In the sequential game, the equilibrium is the latter partition if
player 1 is the ﬁrst mover, but it is the grand coalition otherwise. On the other hand,
if σ3/5 is the relevant solution to apply, then the players’ payoﬀs if the grand coalition
forms are (9.3,7.1,7.6). The grand coalition is now strictly dominant. We conclude that,
for a given solution of the second stage of the cooperation process, diﬀerent bargaining
scenarios to describe the ﬁrst stage may lead to diﬀerent predictions, some eﬃcient, others
not. Moreover, the application of diﬀerent normative principles in the second stage may
also change our predictions in terms of the overall eﬃciency of the cooperation process.
Example 13 Let N = {1,2,3} be the set of agents and let v be the following character-
istic function:
v(N) = 18;
32v({1,2}) = 16; v({1,3}) = 14; v({2,3}) = 12;
v({i}) = 0 for all i.
The outcomes obtained by applying a list of values (σ(S,Π))(S,Π)∈EC that satisfy (S,Π)-
Anonymity, (S,Π)-Eﬃciency and Weak (S,Π)-Marginality, must coincide with the Shap-






The coalition structure {{1,2},{3}} is strictly dominant (ﬁrst eliminate {1,2} and then
{3}). Hence it is also the unique core partition and it is the outcome of our third solution,
for the six possible orderings of the players. Yet v is superadditive and hence the grand
coalition is the only eﬃcient outcome.
10.2 Suﬃcient Conditions for Eﬃciency
So far we have emphasized the possibility of ineﬃcient coalition structures as the predic-
tion of the theory. The reason for these results is that ineﬃciencies are actually the result
of insisting on normative principles of fairness to determine the payoﬀs once coalitions
have formed. These ineﬃciency results yield coalition structures other than the grand
coalition, even for superadditive partition functions. On the other hand, if the surplus to
share when everyone cooperates is large enough, then one expects the grand coalition to
be eﬃcient, and actually to form. We are able to formalize this intuition in the context
of our coalition formation theory, thanks to the normative principles introduced earlier.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the value σ(S,Π) satisﬁes (S,Π)-Anonymity, (S,Π)-Eﬃciency
and Weak (S,Π)-Marginality. Consider a partition function that can be decomposed into





s , for each embedded coalition (S,Π), and
332. v is convex: v(S0) − v(S0 \ {i}) ≥ v(S) − v(S \ {i}) for each i, S, S0 such that
i ∈ S ( S0, and
3. either all the inequalities appearing in 1, or all the inequalities appearing in 2, are
strict,
then {N} is the unique eﬃcient coalition structure, it is strictly dominant, it is the
unique element in the core, and it is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of
the sequential game of coalition formation, for each ordering of the players.
Proof: Condition 1 implies that the grand coalition is eﬃcient for u. Indeed, let Π =
















It is not diﬃcult to check that convexity implies superadditivity for v. Hence the grand
coalition is eﬃcient for v. Condition 3 then implies that the grand coalition is the only
eﬃcient coalition structure for u + v.
Proposition 1’ implies that
xi(Π) = σ
(S,Π)














for each i ∈ S, and each S ∈ P(N), where v0 is the characteristic function deﬁned by
v0(S0) = v(S0∩S), for each S0 ∈ P(N). Though a bit tedious, this property can be checked
via the formula of the Shapley value. A more elegant way to proceed is to apply Young’s
(1985) result. Let S be a coalition, and let σ be the S-value deﬁned as follows: σi(ˆ v) =
ShN
i (ˆ v0), for each characteristic function ˆ v deﬁned for S, with ˆ v0(S0) = ˆ v(S0 ∩S) for each
S0 ∈ P(N). It is not diﬃcult to check that σ satisﬁes S-Anonymity, S-Eﬃciency,17 and
S-Marginality. Hence σ = ShS.





0 \ {i}) ≤ v(S
0) − v(S
0 \ {i})
17Notice indeed that players in N \ S are null in ˆ v0.
34for each S0 ∈ P(N) that contains i. Monotonicity for the Shapley value implies that
Sh
S






The inequality is strict, if v is strictly convex.
Combining equation (4) with conditions 1 and 3 from the statement,
we conclude that {N} is strictly dominant. As already observed before, this also
implies that {N} is the only element in the core, and the unique subgame perfect equi-
librium outcome of the sequential game of coalition formation, for each ordering of the
players. 
Two particular cases of interest are obtained by taking either u or v as the null
partition function. We also remark that condition 3 is important for Proposition 5 to
hold. For example, suppose v(S) = s for every S ⊆ N. For this characteristic function,
every partition is in the core and is supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium of the
coalition formation game.
If the partition function cannot be decomposed into the sum of a symmetric parti-
tion and a characteristic function, then the bounds can prove useful to obtain suﬃcient
conditions for eﬃciency.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the value σ(S,Π) satisﬁes (S,Π)-Anonymity, (S,Π)-Eﬃciency
and (S,Π)-Monotonicity. If the partition function v is such that
ν
(S,Π)
i (v) < µ
(N,{N})
i (v), (5)
for each member i of S, and each embedded coalition (S,Π), then {N} is the unique eﬃ-
cient coalition structure, it is strictly dominant, it is the unique element in the core, and
it is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the sequential game of coalition
formation, for each ordering of the players.



























Hence the grand coalition is the unique eﬃcient coalition structure. The rest of the
35theorem follows at once from Proposition 2’. 
Remember that the grand coalition was not always strictly dominant in Example
12. An ineﬃcient coalition structure was a plausible outcome for some monotonic values.
Proposition 6 implies that in that example the grand coalition is strictly dominant for any
monotonic value if v(N) > 27.5, or if v({2,3}) < 9.5. Even though it is easy to construct
examples where Proposition 6 is applicable, it would be interesting to determine more
primitive conditions on v that would ensure (5).
We have argued that the externality-free value, if taken alone, is not too interesting
for determining the payoﬀs if the grand coalition forms, as part of the partition function
is discarded in its computation. The proﬁle of externality-free values (as characterized in
Proposition 3’), on the other hand, generates a non-trivial problem of coalition formation,
as the payoﬀs within S depends on the organization of N \ S.
We say that the externalities have a negative impact on player i’s (intrinsic) marginal
contributions if
mc(i,S,Π) ≤ mc(i,S,Π0)
for each embedded coalition (S,Π) that contains i, and each partition Π0 that contains
S and that is ﬁner than Π.
Proposition 7 Let σ(S,Π) = (σ(S,Π))∗, for each embedded coalition (S,Π). Let v be a
partition function such that:
1. the associated characteristic function v∗ deﬁned in section 5 is strictly convex:
v∗(S0) − v∗(S0 \ {i}) > v∗(S) − v∗(S \ {i}) for each i, S,S0 such that i ∈ S ( S0,
and
2. externalities have a negative impact on the players’ marginal contributions.
Then {N} is the unique eﬃcient coalition structure, it is strictly dominant, it is the
unique element in the core, and it is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of
the sequential game of coalition formation, for each ordering of the players.
Proof: We ﬁrst prove that {N} is the unique eﬃcient coalition structure. Observe that
externalities must be negative in v. Indeed, let (S,Π) and (S,Π0) be two embedded
coalitions such that Π is coarser than Π0. We may assume without loss of generality (up
to a relabeling of the players) that S = {1,...,s}. Let
ξi = v({1,...,i},{{1,...,i}} ∪ {{j}|j = i + 1,...,s} ∪ Π−S)
36−v({1,...,i − 1},{{1,...,i − 1}} ∪ {{j}|j = i,...,s} ∪ Π−S)
ξ0
i = v({1,...,i},{{1,...,i}} ∪ {{j}|j = i + 1,...,s} ∪ Π0
−S)
−v({1,...,i − 1},{{1,...,i − 1}} ∪ {{j}|j = i,...,s} ∪ Π0
−S)
for each i ∈ {1,...,s}. Observe that v(S,Π) =
Ps




other hand, ξi ≤ ξ0
i, for each i ∈ {1,...,s}, because the externalities have a negative
impact on the players’ marginal contributions. Hence v(S,Π) ≤ v(S,Π0). In particular,










The strict inequality is a consequence of the strict superadditivity of v∗ (implied by strict
convexity, as already argued in the proof of Proposition 5).
Let (S,Π) be an embedded coalition and let i be a member of S. Consider the
characteristic functions w and (v∗
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and hence {N} is strictly dominant, which also implies that it is the unique element in
the core, and that it is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the sequential
game of coalition formation, for each ordering of the players. The ﬁrst equality follows
from the deﬁnition of x and (σ(S,Π))∗. The second equality is similar to (3) in the proof
of Proposition 5. As for the weak inequality, observe that the marginal contributions of
player i is not smaller in (v∗
S)0 than in w, because externalities have a negative impact on
the players’ marginal contributions. The inequality then follows, since the Shapley value
37is a weighted sum of these marginal contributions. The strict inequality follows from the
strict convexity of v∗ (similar to the argument developed in the penultimate paragraph
in the proof of Proposition 5). The last equality follows from the deﬁnition of σ∗. 
As already observed in the proof of Proposition 7, if externalities have a negative
impact on the players’ marginal contributions, then externalities are negative. Negative
externalities are not enough, though, to guarantee the formation of the grand coali-
tion. Consider for instance the following four-player partition function: v(N,{N}) = 1,
v({2},{{1},{2},{3,4}}) = v({2},{{2},{1,3,4}}) = −10, v(S,Π) = 1/3 for each em-
bedded coalition (S,Π) such that {3,4} ⊆ S and S 6= N, and v(S,Π) = 0 for all the
remaining embedded coalitions. Externalities are negative and v∗ is convex (a slight
variation would make it strictly convex). Yet {N} is not strictly dominant, because
x1({1,2},{3,4}}) = 5 > 1/4 = x1({N}). The coalition structure {{1,2},{3,4}} actually
belongs to the core (as well as {N}). It is also the unique subgame perfect equilibrium
outcome of the sequential solution associated to the ordering (1,3,4,2).
11 A Fully Normative Treatment of Superadditive
Partition Functions
We have seen that our two-stage cooperation process may lead to ineﬃciencies, even
for superadditive partition functions. An alternative route is to apply a fully normative
analysis to solve simultaneously the problem of coalition formation and of payoﬀ distri-
bution. Indeed, the axiom of eﬃciency could be rewritten to express overall eﬃciency,
instead of eﬃciency relative to a speciﬁc coalition that has cristalized. Which approach
(the fully cooperative or the two-stage process) is more relevant depends on the context.
If the partition function is superadditive, then overall eﬃciency is equivalent to requir-
ing that the sum of the payoﬀs exhaust the surplus associated with the grand coalition.
It is thus important to observe that our axiomatic results remain valid on the class of
superadditive partition functions.18
Young (1985) notice on page 71 that his proof may be adapted so that the argument
involves only superadditive characteristic functions. A similar idea can be pursued to
adapt the proofs of Propositions 1 and 3 once restricted to the class of superadditive
18If a value satisfy some properties on a large class of partition functions, then so does it on any smaller
class. Nevertheless, there could be more values satisfying those properties on smaller classes, hence the
necessity to adapt some arguments when it comes to prove uniqueness or the tightness of the bounds.
38partition functions. We have: 1) If σ is a value that satisﬁes Anonymity, Eﬃciency
and Weak Marginality on the class of superadditive partition functions, and if v is a
superadditive partition function such that v = u + v0, for some (u,v0) ∈ S × C,19 then
σi(u+v) =
u(N)
n +Shi(v0), for each i ∈ N; 2) σ∗ is the unique value satisfying Anonymity,
Eﬃciency and Marginality on the class of superadditive partition functions. Let’s show
how to adapt the proof of Proposition 3 to obtain this second statement. The details
regarding the modiﬁed Proposition 1 are left to the interested reader. The problem is to
prove uniqueness.20 For this, we focus on the set V of superadditive partition functions
that can be written as a diﬀerence u−
P
(S,Π)∈EC β(S,Π)e(S,Π), for some symmetric parti-
tion function u, and some non-negative real numbers β(S,Π). We can apply an inductive
argument as before to prove that any value that satisﬁes Anonymity, Eﬃciency and Weak
Marginality must coincide with σ∗ on V. Notice that superadditivity is preserved through
summation, and that each partition function in the basis is superadditive. Deleting any
of the terms of the form β(S,Π)e(S,Π) leads to another superadditive partition function,
and hence one is sure to remain within V throughout the inductive argument. The last
step of the proof is to show that V actually coincides with the entire set of superad-
dititve partition functions. Indeed, let v be any superadditive partition function, let
P








β(S,Π) := ¯ α(s) − α(S,Π).
Then, v = u −
P
(S,Π)∈EC β(S,Π)e(S,Π), where u is symmetric and β(S,Π) ≥ 0 for all
(S,Π), as desired.
The methodology leading to the bounds in Proposition 2 remains valid, but one has to
restrict Mi(v) and Ni(v) to superadditive partition functions, hence possibly worsening
the bounds.
Finally, one can also prove Proposition 4 on the class of superadditive partition func-
tions, by placing all the negative terms appearing in the decomposition (2) on the left-
hand side, so as to have only superadditive partition functions on both sides of the
equality.
19u and v0 need not be superadditive for the result to hold.
20The argument in the proof of Proposition 3 is not valid when restricting ourselves to superaddi-
tive partition functions, because the partition function v0 deﬁned in the induction is not necessarily
superadditive.
3912 Comparisons with the Coalition Formation Liter-
ature
The resolution of the second stage of our cooperation process (cf. Section 9) is inspired
by Aumann and Dr` eze’s (1974, Section 3) adaptation of the Shapley value to charac-
teristic functions with an existing coalition structure. They reproduce in Section 12.6
an informal argument due to Michael Maschler to determine endogenously the coalition
structure that forms. They observe that the ﬁnal outcome may be ineﬃcient for some
superadditive characteristic functions. Example 13 formalizes and strengthens that ob-
servation, showing that an ineﬃcient partition may be strictly dominant. In this context,
Proposition 5 oﬀers an interesting suﬃcient condition for eﬃciency. Our contribution is
also to extend Aumann and Dr` eze’s methodology to - and obtain some qualitative results
for - problems with externalities.
Shenoy (1979) and Hart and Kurz (1983) study a similar two-stage cooperation process
for characteristic functions. Shenoy introduces a dynamic solution to discuss situations
where the core of the coalition formation game is empty. He studies the properties of -
and relations that may exist between - the core and the dynamic solution, for diﬀerent
solutions of the second stage. His analysis of the Shapley value (see Section 7 of his paper)
focuses mainly on “simple games.” Hart and Kurz study yet another division rule once
a coalition structure is formed. While Aumann and Dr` eze assume that a group cannot
share more than the surplus it generates once it forms, Hart and Kurz apply the Owen
value, which shares the surplus of the grand coalition whatever the coalition structure
that forms. Outcomes are always eﬃcient in the cooperation process studied by Hart and
Kurz. Even though they focus only on characteristic functions, some externalities exist
when the coalitions form, as a consequence of the deﬁnition of the Owen value. Their
paper contains a discussion of the core, based on diﬀerent possible reactions of the players
left behind after the formation of a blocking coalition.
More recent papers focus on the problem of coalition formation, leaving the second
stage of the cooperation process as a black box. Each player derives some utility from his
membership to the diﬀerent coalitions. Some authors say in that case that preferences are
hedonic. Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) study the existence of core stable partitions
and other weaker notions of stability. Banerjee et al (2001) introduce the concept of top
coalition (similar to our concept of strict dominance when there are no externalities) to
prove the non-emptiness of the core in some economic applications (see also Alcalde and
Revilla (2004)). Proposition 5, applied to the case u = 0, could be added to that list of
40applications that admit a strictly dominant partition.
The problem of coalition formation for partition functions, or more generally for games
with strategic externalities, has been the subject of a growing literature over the past few
years; see Bloch (2002). Bloch (1996) for instance studies a speciﬁc bargaining procedure
to solve the ﬁrst stage of the cooperation process, while the second stage is solved by a
ﬁxed arbitrary division rule (hence adding the possibility of externalities to the hedonic
games described in the previous paragraph). Beyond the fact that we study diﬀerent so-
lutions for determining the coalitions that form, we obtain interesting results by focusing
on division rules that satisfy some of the normative principles introduced in the previous
sections. Many other authors focus on speciﬁc bargaining procedures to simultaneously
determine the coalitions that form and the distribution of the surplus (Ray and Vohra
(1999), Montero (1999), Maskin (2003)). Ray and Vohra (2001) study a core-like solu-
tion, assuming that only subcoalitions can block. Our observation that ineﬃciency may
be due entirely to the presence of externalities (see Example 11) conﬁrms similar conclu-
sions previously obtained in these diﬀerent frameworks. Given the complexity of some of
these models, attention is often restricted to symmetric partition functions. Proposition 5
is a result of that type when v equals 0.
Maskin (2003) shows that, for his cooperation process, the eﬃcient partition forms
whenever externalities are non-positive and the partition function is strictly superadditive
(to be compared with the conclusion we reached in Example 13).21 It is important to
emphasize though that all these results on the eﬃciency of the “equilibrium” outcomes
strongly depend on the type of cooperation process one considers. One can construct
cooperation processes that lead to an eﬃcient outcome with or without externalities (see
Hafalir (2006) for an example related to the Shapley value). And one can also construct
other bargaining processes that lead to an ineﬃcient outcome only in the presence of
externalities. In the end, the interest of these diﬀerent results should be judged on their
robustness and on the appeal of the cooperation process under study. In our process, the
results are robust to diﬀerent ways to model the ﬁrst stage and to a wide class of payoﬀ
distribution rules in the second stage. Our two-stage cooperation process also describes
relevant scenarios, in which players’ commitments to coalitions precede the determination
of individual payoﬀs.
21His result holds for three-player partition functions. Additional conditions are required for it to
extend to partition functions with more than three players, as pointed out in de Clippel and Serrano
(2005).
4113 Conclusion
This paper has explored partition functions. Our basic approach is rooted in the concept
of marginal contributions of players to coalitions. In problems involving externalities, we
have argued how it is important to separate the concept of intrinsic marginal contributions
from that of externalities.
The paper is divided into two parts, each corresponding to a diﬀerent methodol-
ogy. The ﬁrst is axiomatic and presumes an exogenously given coalition structure. For
instance, when the grand coalition is together, the implications of Anonymity, Monotonic-
ity and Marginality are explored, leading to two main results. The ﬁrst one establishes
bounds to players’ payoﬀs if they are to be derived from solutions that are monotonic
with respect to the (weak version of) marginal contributions. The second result provides
a sharp characterization of a solution that captures value-like principles, if one abstracts
from the externalities. The combination of both results provides insights to the size of
the Pigouvian-like transfers compatible with our normative principles. Based on this
analysis, one can extend the results to arbitrary coalition structures.
In the second part of the paper, we make the coalition structure endogenous and
ask questions of coalition formation. Our way of modeling coalition formation combines
players’ strategizing at the time of forming coalitions with the normative principles behind
the value once a coalition structure is in place. We learn that those normative principles
applied to every coalition are the source of ineﬃcient coalition structures, but we are able
to identify a handful of suﬃcient conditions on the partition function to obtain the grand
coalition as the prediction of our theory.
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